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11. INTRODUCTION
How predictable are currency devaluations? Do movements of macroeconomic
fundamentals contain information regarding the future sustainability of a currency
peg?  What information concerning the credibility of an exchange rate target can we
gather from the observed behaviour of currency markets? These questions seem
increasingly relevant within the framework of a globalized and deregulated economic
system where on the one hand market participants pursue international portfolio
diversification; and, on the other, a number of national central banks set exchange rate
targets in an effort to achieve price stability. The 1990s saw a number of currency-
pegs collapses, some of which share common background macroeconomic
similarities. Have markets drawn any conclusions from these events? And how are the
latter relevant to monetary policy makers? In particular, do Central Banks, in view of
past experience, determine their policies taking into consideration the behaviour of
currency markets?  In this paper we attempt to provide some insights regarding the
link between fundamentals, market behaviour and central bank decisions based on a
fairly recent currency-peg collapse, the one of the Greek drachma. In March 1998, the
latter was devalued against the ECU by 14%. This event discontinued the strong
drachma policy to which Greek monetary authorities were at the time officially
committed. The policy, based on an “the-advantages-of-tying-one’s-own-hands” logic
(see Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988) and implemented consistently since 1988,
effectively involved a rate of nominal depreciation of the drachma against the DM
smaller than the inflation differential between Greece and Germany. Indeed, the
1990s saw a significant reduction in Greek inflation and interest rates on government
bonds (see Figure 1). And yet, despite the progress achieved, the drachma was
2devalued. Was the devaluation predictable? We address the question from two points
of view. First, we investigate whether the drachma/DM exchange rate is linked to
macroeconomic fundamentals and, if it is, whether drachma’s peg to the DM was
consistent with their movements. Second, we investigate whether markets perceived
the peg as credible, i.e. whether they anticipated the devaluation. The questions are
interesting not least because at present a number of countries set exchange rate targets
in an environment of increasing financial liberalisation. For example, it is now very
likely that the countries which aspire to be involved in the next EU enlargement (e.g.
transition economies) will be asked to participate in the ERM-II mechanism. The
Greek experience may provide useful lessons concerning devaluation risks and
markets’ behaviour in the presence of fixed exchange rate policies. The remainder of
the paper is structured follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature review. Section 3
presents the data and our econometric results. Section 4 discusses the results. Section
5 summarises and concludes.
2. EXCHANGE RATES AND FUNDAMENTALS: A BRIEF REVIEW
The question as to whether macroeconomic fundamentals influence the behaviour of
the exchange rate is certainly not a new one. For example, Meese and Rogoff (1983a)
suggest that the random walk model outperforms a range of fundamentals-based
models of exchange rate determination at horizons of up to a year, an opinion still
shared by many economists (see e.g. Frenkel and Rose, 1995, Rogoff 1999). On the
other hand, the same authors (Meese and Rogoff, 1983b) find that the random walk
model does not yield the minimum forecast errors when the forecast horizon is
extended to periods beyond twelve months, a conclusion supported by Mark (1995)
3and Chinn and Meese (1995). This second group of findings suggest that if
fundamentals play a role in exchange rate determination, this is more relevant in a
long-run framework. To investigate the validity of this proposition economists set-off
by testing whether the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition holds in the long-run
(MacDonald, 1999). The reason is that PPP is a basic assumption in a number of
fundamentals-based models of exchange rate determination where the exchange-rates
regime is a floating one1; but also in a number of fundamentals-based models of
speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate2. If the PPP hypothesis were
consistent with the data, PPP calculations would have significant diagnostic value in
order to assess whether a currency is fundamentally over- or undervalued (Isard,
1995). Failure to establish the validity of the PPP would imply that PPP-based models
may have to be reconsidered in the light of the empirical evidence. Since Frenkel
(1981a) concluded that PPP had collapsed in the 1970s, a number of researchers have
dealt with the issue, mainly using integration and cointegration econometric
techniques. In this context, PPP tests have mainly taken two forms. Initially,
researchers focused on the time series properties of real exchange rates. According to
both versions of the PPP (absolute and relative), the real exchange rate, qt, should be
constant over time. If long-run PPP holds, qt should be mean-reverting and described
by equation (1) below:
qt = ρ  qt-1 + εt , 0< ρ <1 εt ∼ N(0,σ2)  (1)
                                                          
1 For example in the flex-price monetary model (see e.g. Frenkel, 1976) or in sticky-price
(overshooting) monetary models (see e.g. Dornbuch, 1976);
2  See e.g. Krugman (1979) and Obstfeld (1986).
4Researchers testing the existence of mean-reversion in real exchange rate series
typically concluded that qt is a random walk process (see e.g. Adler and Lehmann,
1983). However such tests were subsequently criticised on the basis of the low power
of univariate unit root test (see e.g. Abuaf and Jorion, 1990); and for implicitly
imposing potentially invalid restrictions (see below). As a result, research on PPP
mainly focused on the investigation of the existence and the nature of a long-run
relationship between nominal exchange rates and relative prices. This approach
involves the application of cointegration techniques on an equation like (2):
st = α + β1  pt  + β2 p*t + εt  (2)
In (2), st is the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, α is a constant term, pt and p*t
are the logarithms of the domestic and foreign price level respectively and εt is a white
noise term. If st, pt and p*t are integrated of order 1, any meaningful discussion on
PPP pre-supposes that the residual term εt is stationary. If εt is indeed I(0), for the
relative version of PPP to be valid in its so-called strong form, price changes in the
two countries should exert a homogeneous and symmetric impact on the exchange
rate, i.e. β1 = 1 and β2 = -1. In that case, equation (2) can also be written as equation
(3) below:
st = α + β 
*p
p
  + εt ,            β = 1              (3)
5PPP tests employing equation (1) implicitly impose the homogeneity and symmetry
restrictions β1 = 1, β2 = -13. PPP tests based on equations like (3) implicitly impose
the symmetry restriction β1 = -β2. However, both restrictions are based on the
assumption of zero transportation costs, identically-constructed price indexes in the
home and foreign country and no measurement errors in the price series. Since these
assumptions are usually not valid, the unfavourable to PPP results reached by studies
using equations (1) and (3)4 are often attributed to the implicit imposition of invalid
restrictions. Taking into consideration factors like measurement errors and
transactions costs, some form of PPP, the so-called weak-form PPP, is valid provided
that the econometric analysis yields cointegration among the variables in equation (2),
even if the estimated coefficients are not consistent with symmetry and homogeneity
(see Taylor, 1988 and Cheung and Lai, 1993). PPP in its weak form only presupposes
that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. Most empirical studies conducted within this framework (see
e.g. MacDonald, 1993, Kugler and Lenz, 1993, Cheung and Lai,1993), provide
evidence suggesting that long-run PPP holds and real exchange rates are mean-
reverting. However, the size of the reversion is suggested to be in the range of three to
five years, far too slow to be consistent with traditional PPP analysis or the real
exchange rate movements predicted by overshooting models (see e.g. Dornbuch,
1976). A number of explanations have been proposed to reconcile these findings with
the PPP hypothesis. One is that the latter does not consider the effect of real shocks on
the real exchange rate: it only accounts for monetary ones. However, this explanation
is not satisfactory by itself given the high short-run volatility observed in the level of
nominal exchange rates relative to the levels of the underlying fundamentals. Other
                                                          
3 In terms of logarithms, the real exchange rate q is given by an equation of the form qt = st + pt – p*t. If,
measurement errors exist in the calculation of pt and p*t, the observed price indexes are biased and the
series on which unit root tests are performed are not in reality the actual real exchange rate series.
4 See for example Corbae and Ouliaris (1988), Enders (1988), and Taylor (1988).
6explanations (see Rogoff, 1996, 1999) highlight the role of frictions like transaction
costs, impediments to trade, imperfect information and pricing-to-market commercial
tactics. Such frictions create a buffer zone within which exchange rates respond in
changes in goods prices slowly, whereas outside the band they adjust much faster.
Studies taking into consideration such non-linear adjustments yield estimated speeds
consistent with traditional PPP (see e.g. Michael et al, 1997 and O’Connell, 1998).
2. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY, DATA AND RESULTS
In this section we apply Johansen’s (1988) multivariate cointegration methodology to
investigate the validity of the PPP hypothesis regarding the drachma/DM exchange
rate for the period of floating exchange rates (1975-1998)5. Since the Johansen
methodology is widely used in empirical research we will not present it in detail here.
The DM was selected to be the reference currency in our analysis as Germany and the
countries which used to participate in the ERM before the launch of euro (hence the
drachma values of their currencies were determined by the level of the drachma/DM
rate) are, by far, the most important trading partner of Greece. Our data source is the
International Financial Statistics Databank provided by Datastream. The analysis is in
terms of end-of-period spot exchange rate series6. The price levels used are wholesale
                                                          
5 Tests regarding the validity of the PPP for various drachma exchange rates have also been conducted
by Brissimis and Leventakis (1984), Karfakis and Moschos (1989) and more recently by Dockery and
Georgellis (1994), Bahmani-Oskooee (1995) and Voumvaki et al (1998). The results reached by these
studies, which employ alternative methodologies, are mixed.
6 The International Financial Statistics does not provide national currency/DM exchange rates whereas
Datastream does not provide a data series for the drachma/DM exchange rate extending back to 1975.
As a result, we had to calculate the cross-rate between the drachma and the DM using the
drachma/dollar and DM/dollar series.
7price indexes (line 63)7. Our analysis is based on quarterly data and covers the period
1975-1 to 1998-4, a total of 96 observations, covering a period of 24 years.
We first investigate the order of integration of the variables involved. The ADF tests
reported in Table 1 suggest that the logarithms of the drachma/DM exchange rate and
the German WPI (st and p*t respectively) are integrated of order one whereas their
first differences are stationary8. Regarding the Greek WPI, the relevant unit root test
suggests that ∆pt is an I(1) series. However, this result is rather unconvincing as the
existence of a trend in the rate of growth of prices is very difficult to interpret9. A
careful look at the graph of ∆pt in the Appendix suggests that the non-rejection of the
unit root hypothesis may well be the result of structural breaks in the series. The issue
of structural breaks and how to test for them is quite extended to be discussed here
(see Maddala and Kim, 1998). Fortunately, as far as the Greek economy is concerned,
the existence of structural monetary breaks is a well-established fact and their timing
is also more or less known (see e.g. Alogoskoufis and Philippopoulos, 1992 and
Alogoskoufis, 1995). If the breaks in the series are known it is relatively simple to
adjust the ADF test by including dummy variables to ensure that there are as many
regressors as there are deterministic components in the data generating process
(Harris, 1995, p. 40). Hence, we have added to the relevant ADF equation  two
                                                          
7 Wholesale price indexes are preferred to consumer price indexes on the grounds that they contain a
much higher proportion of traded goods. As a result, biases due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect
(according to which PPP is violated because non-traded goods are cheaper in terms of a common
currency in countries with lower per-capita income) are less pronounced.
8 The lag-length of the ADF tests is such as to ensure that the residual term in the ADF equation is a
white noise process. Given that the analysis which follows is based on quarterly data, strictly speaking,
one should also test for the existence of seasonal unit roots. However, it is well known that seasonal
unit roots are not encountered very often in macroeconomic series which can typically be described as
I(1) with a deterministic seasonal pattern superimposed (Osborn, 1993, p. 300). As a result, and due to
space limitations, seasonal unit roots tests are not presented here.
9 For example, a non-stationary inflation rate would imply a non-stationary real interest rate. It would
be very difficult to sustain such a conclusion as a steady-state equilibrium situation, unless one makes
the (also highly unlikely) assumption that the nominal interest rate is also non-stationary.
8dummies: the first, takes the value of 1 for the period 1979-1 to 1985-1 and 0
otherwise, capturing the effect of the particularly expansionary monetary policies
followed by Greece during that period. The second, takes the value of 1 for the period
following 1993-1 to 1998-4 and 0 otherwise, capturing the effect of the change in the
policy regime towards price stabilisation. The adjusted ADF equation suggests that
the ∆pt series is an I(0) process with structural breaks.  
We then test for the number of long-run relationships using Johansen’s (1988)
cointegration methodology. To that end, we estimate a number of VAR models
(including a constant restricted to the cointegration space and unrestricted,
deterministic, centred seasonal dummies)10, making use of different lag structures.
Table 2, panel A presents the values of the Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn and Akaike
information criteria associated with each lag structure, together with a number of
system mispecification tests. Two out of the three information criteria suggest that a
VAR structure involving two lags is the most appropriate specification whereas the
third suggests a lag-length of 1. For the latter, all diagnostic tests suggest system
mispecification. Hence, we select a VAR structure with two lags. However, for this
lag order (as for all lag structures in Table 2, panel A), there is a problem of residuals’
non-normality. To acquire Gaussian residuals, we investigated the statistical
significance of dummy variables corresponding to one-off exogenous monetary
shocks in Greece and in Germany. Out of these, five incidents proved statistically
significant: the drachma devaluation of January 1983 (D1983-1); the drachma
devaluation of March 1998 (D1998-1); and three major jumps in the DM/US dollar
                                                          
10 Elimination of the constant term from the cointegration space would be equivalent to testing the
validity of only the absolute version of PPP. However, the cointegration results which follow are not
affected in case the constant is not restricted to the cointegration space. Seasonal dummies are centred
9exchange rate (D1980-2, D1985-3, D1985-4). Adding these dummies as unrestricted
variables (not entering the cointegration space) yields a well-specified system and
individual equations with Gaussian errors (see Table 2, panel B)11.
Panel A in Table 3 presents the results of the cointegration tests. Both the rank (λmax)
and the trace (λtrace) statistics suggest the existence of one cointegrating vector. Table
3, panel B sheds some additional light regarding its nature. First, three LR-statistics
are presented testing whether each of the three variables enter the cointegration space.
All of them appear to do so. The fact that st enters the cointegrating vector confirms,
combined with a statistically significant constant term, that some form of relative PPP
is valid. We then present the results of the weak exogeneity LR tests proposed by
Johansen and Juselius (1992). These consist of testing zero restrictions on the
elements of the α matrix (i.e. the matrix of coefficients of the speed of adjustment to
long-run equilibrium) embedded in the estimated Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM). The results suggest that only p*t is weakly exogenous to the system. This
confirms that PPP is not a model of exchange rate determination per se. It is a long-
run equilibrium condition between two endogenous variables, st and pt where long-run
causality runs both ways. In addition, Greece’s own price level changes does not
determine in any way foreign inflation (a reasonable conclusion given that Greece is a
                                                                                                                                                                     
to ensure that they sum to zero over time and thus they do not affect the underlying asymptotic
distributions upon which the tests for cointegration rank depend (see Harris, 1995, p. 81).
11 Acquiring Gaussian errors by means of adding dummy variables other than the centred seasonal ones
may sometimes by costly as the extra dummies will affect the underlying distribution of cointegrating
rank statistics. In that case the power of the cointegration tests is reduced and the published critical
values will only be indicative (see Harris 1995, p. 81). However, in our case there are two factors
which make us believe that our results are robust. First, even without these dummies, the nature of the
results of the cointegration analysis which follows remain the same (the results of the cointegration
tests without the dummies are not included here due to space limitations but are available by the author
upon request). Second, even when the dummies are included in the system, the existence of one
cointegrating vector is statistically significant at the 1% level; whereas the values of the trace and
maximal eigenvalue testing for different cointegration ranks are way apart the critical values (see Table
3, panel A).
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small country). After imposing the identified valid restriction αp* = 0, we arrive at an
estimated cointegrating vector involving coefficients significantly different to those
implied by the proportionality and symmetry restrictions (Table 3, panel C). Finally,
given that p*t is weakly exogenous, one can safely assume that in terms of a Vector
Error Correction Model (VECM), the equation for ∆p*t  contains no information about
the long-run cointegration vector since the cointegration relationships do not enter
into this equation. It is therefore valid to condition on p*t and proceed with a partial
version of the VECM where only the equations for ∆st and ∆pt are estimated (see
Harris, 1995 p. 98). The estimated VECM equations can then be considered as the
processes describing short-run dynamics12.
4. DISCUSSION OF ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Three main results emerge from our econometric analysis: First, PPP is a long-run
equilibrium condition regarding the drachma/DM exchange rate from which
deviations cannot be sustained in the long-run, unless real (demand or supply) shocks
are taking place to justify them. In the case of Greece, relative PPP was violated for a
ten-year period (1988-1997), a time-horizon which can be safely assumed to be
prolonged. At the same time, there exists evidence (see Arghyrou, 2000), suggesting
that Greece’s relative competitiveness vis-à-vis its main trading partners was
declining during the same period, i.e. no relative positive supply shocks were taking
place to justify the real appreciation of the drachma. In this framework, the ultimate
                                                          
12 Due to space limitations, the estimated VECM equations are not presented here. However, it is
necessary to mention that both the equation for ∆st and ∆pt  are well specified (none of the diagnostic
tests suggests any form of mispecification). The VECM includes one lag for ∆st, ∆pt and ∆p*t  (the
latter however is not modelled since p*t is weakly exogenous to the system) and the (restricted)
cointegrating vector estimated in Table 3, panel C, lagged for one period. It also includes three seasonal
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collapse of the peg of the drachma to the DM was predictable as it was inconsistent
with the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals, i.e. declining but yet existent
inflation and productivity differentials vis-à-vis the EU average and a widening
current account deficit caused by drachma’s overvaluation13.
Our second result is that the strong drachma helped Greece reduce its inflation. A
strong-currency policy is by definition a policy where the level of the exchange rate
acquires the character of an exogenous variable. This basically implies that in our
cointegration vector, the only endogenous variable during the period of the
application of the strong-drachma policy was the domestic price level. Normalising
the cointegrating vector on pt yields a rather significant coefficient for the level of the
exchange rate (0.77). The restraining of the growth of the level of the exchange rate
imposed by the strong drachma policy, in combination with the reduction in the other
exogenous variable of the system, (German/EU inflation) can largely explain the
significant reduction of Greek inflation between 1993 and 1997.
Our third and final result is that foreign exchange markets behaved in a way
consistent with the hypothesis that they started anticipating a change in the parity of
the drachma as early as mid-1997; but the exact timing of the devaluation took them
by surprise. We base this argument on two tests. The first is the forecasts provided by
the estimation of the VECM equations mentioned in section 3. Estimating the
VECM14 for the period 1975-2 to 1997-4 yields the forecast band for the change in
                                                                                                                                                                     
dummies and the five unrestricted dummies earlier mentioned. These were added to ensure Gaussian
error terms. Their exclusion does not affect the nature of the results.
13 The current account deficit (in terms of % in Greek GDP) has as follows: 1994: 1%; 1995: 2.7%;
1996: 3.5%; 1997: 3.7%. Source: European Economy No 64, Statistical Appendix.
14 The VECM system from which the forecasts presented in Figures 2 and 3 emerge is estimated on the
basis of the (restricted) cointegration vector resulting from a cointegration analysis covering the period
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the drachma’s value against the DM which appears in Figure 2. The actual outcome in
1998-1 lies outside the band. This suggests that the devaluation, when it occurred, was
“news” to the market. However, going a little back in time reveals a similar but
slightly different picture. Estimating the VECM for the period 1975-2 to 1997-1
yields the set of forecasts which appear in Figure 3. The actual outcome of 1998-1 is
once again outside the forecast band. However, one notices that the position of the
forecast bands at the beginning of 1997 presents an upwards trend for the period
1997-2 to 1998-1. Given that the VECM is estimated using data which in 1997-1 was
public information, one might interpret the shifting of the forecast band in a way
suggesting that early in 1997 markets foresaw the possibility of an upwards
adjustment in the value of the drachma in the following year or so. This conclusion is
further supported by our second test regarding the credibility of the drachma’s peg to
the DM. This is a simple test suggested by De Grauwe (1997) and is essentially based
on a comparison between the value of the exchange rate target set by a central bank
(or the upper limit of a target zone) and the implicit forward rate as the latter is
derived by the covered interest parity condition (CIP)15. The idea behind the test is
quite simple: as the forward rate reveals the markets’ risk-adjusted expectation
                                                                                                                                                                     
1975-1/1997-4. The reason is that if we had estimated the VECM based on cointegration analysis
covering the period 1975-1/1998-4, the forecast for 1998-1 would have been a function of the
outcomes observed in 1998, as the lagged cointegrating vector entering the VECM would have been
estimated using the whole sample, 1975-1/1998-4. Space limitations do not allow us to present the
results of the cointegration analysis covering the period 1975-1/1997-4 here. We restrict ourselves in
saying that they are identical to the ones presented in Table 3. The (reduced-form) cointegrating vector
is given by st = 4.9261 +1.2903 p – 2.6873 p*. Finally, the estimated VECM from which Figures 2 and
3 emerge are conditioned on ∆p*t  (given that p* again appears to be weakly exogenous to the system)
and do not present any kind of mispecification.
15 There seems to be little doubt that CIP condition holds as a long-run relationship (for a survey of the
evidence, see Gibson, 1996 and the evidence therein). CIP states that Ft,T  = St 
Tt
Tt
r
r
,
,
*1
1
+
+
 , where Ft,T
is the forward rate prevailing at time t for delivery at time T, St  is the spot exchange rate, and rt,T and
r*t,T  the domestic and foreign effective rate of return between time t and T respectively. For the
purpose of the test which we employ it is preferable to use the implicit rate (i.e. calculate the value of
Ft,T  based on the observed variables of St, rt,T and r*t,T ) rather than use the observed forward market for
two reasons. First, because we neutralise the effect of factors which might lead to short-run deviations
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regarding the future spot exchange rate, if it exceeds the upper limit of a target-zone,
there exist indications suggesting that market participants expect (in a risk-adjusted
sense) that the future spot rate will not be within the announced target. In short, it is
an indication that the target zone is not perceived to be credible16. Figure 4 presents,
on a monthly basis, a comparison between the implied one-year drachma/DM forward
rate (calculated using end-of-period spot exchange rates and end-of-period annualised
overnight interbank interest rates17) and the spot exchange rate for the period for
which the Bank of Greece announced official exchange rate targets (1995 to 1998)18.
The scale is normalised to unity in order to facilitate inference. Various interesting
points emerge. First, the markets never perceived the official zone-targets as credible
as the forward premium had always been higher than 5% above the spot rate. Second,
the credibility of the drachma’s peg to the DM improved considerably between
January 1995 and May 1997 with the implied forward premium declining from 12%
to 6%. Third, the credibility of the peg stops improving as early as June 1997 (almost
one year before the devaluation), before the onset of the South-East Asia crisis. When
the latter broke, a speculative attack against the drachma took place (in November
                                                                                                                                                                     
from CIP, e.g. short-lived political uncertainty. Second, because in this way we correct the effects of
data imperfections.
16 Implicitly, the test assumes that foreign exchange markets are efficient. This implies that the forward
rate equals the market’s expectation regarding the future spot rate plus a risk premium (Ft,T = Set(T)
+ρt). If the forward rate Ft,T exceeds the upper bound of a target zone Sup there exist two possibilities:
either the expected future spot rate is higher than the upper limit of the zone (Set(T)>Sup); or the
perceived risk associated with the value of the future spot rate is too high. In both cases, the peg suffers
from a credibility problem.
17 Overnight interbank interest rates are widely viewed as the best indicators of the monetary conditions
prevailing at a given point in time. For Greece, we use the annualised end-of-month interest rate
observed in the overnight interbank money market. For Germany we use the annualised end-of-month
call-money rate. The data source for Greek rates is the Economic Bulletin of the Bank of Greece
(various editions). The data source for the German rate is Datastream (code GERMDRD).
18 The exchange rate targets set by the Bank of Greece have as follows: For 1995: depreciation not
higher than 3% against the ECU (Bank of Greece, Report of the Governor for 1994, p. 48). For 1996:
stable exchange rate against the ECU (Bank of Greece, Report of the Governor for 1995, p. 49); For
1997: stable exchange rate against the currencies which constitute the ECU (Bank of Greece, Report of
the Governor for 1996, p. 37); for 1998; exchange rate fluctuations which, on average, will not deviate
from the central parities of the drachma against the currencies which constitute the ECU by ±2.5%
(Bank of Greece, Report of the Governor for 1997, p. 54).
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1997). On that occasion, the Bank of Greece managed to beat the speculators by
increasing significantly the overnight interbank money market rate (reflected in the
peak reported in Figure 4) and proceeding to foreign exchange interventions.
However, as international monetary conditions started returning to normality (early
1998), we observe that despite continuous reassurances at the highest level that there
exists no imminent change in the parity of the drachma, the drachma/DM forward
premium takes values well above those of early 1997. All in all, Figure 4 is consistent
with a scenario according to which markets lost confidence to the drachmas’ peg to
the DM in mid-1997, a fact which became more evident after the South-East Asia
crisis. The realisation of this fact prompted the Bank of Greece to devalue the
drachma at an unexpected point in time (three months after successfully repelling a
speculative attack) and, from that point of view, take the markets by surprise.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has examined whether the collapse of an exchange rate peg is predictable
on the basis of the movements of the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals and
the observed behaviour of currency markets. Our verdict is a conditional yes. Our
results suggest that the ultimate collapse of the peg is predictable if the latter is clearly
inconsistent with valid long-run macroeconomic relationships. Furthermore,
concerning the case study examined, our findings indicate that currency markets
behaved in a way suggesting that they anticipated a collapse of the peg well before it
took place. However, the exact timing of the devaluation took the markets by surprise.
There emerge three main messages of wider interest from these results. First,
fundamentals matter in long-run exchange rate determination. Second, markets
15
acknowledge this fact and act accordingly. And third, even under conditions of
devaluation expectations, Central Banks can still surprise the markets, provided they
choose the correct timing.
Regarding the particular case of Greece, our findings suggest that the strong-drachma
policy was helpful in terms of achieving inflation convergence but not inflation
equalization with Germany. As economic theory suggests (see, among others, De
Grauwe, 1996 and Persson and Tabellini, 1996), and as it actually happened in
countries where the authorities maintained an overvalued exchange rate for too long
(e.g. in Italy and Spain in 1992-93 and Mexico in 1994), eventually, Greece had to
abandon the peg19. From that point of view, the Greek devaluation of 1998 involves a
certain deja-vu element. The difference is that in the case of the countries mentioned
above, the markets forced the devaluation. In the case of Greece, the central bank had
learned from the others’ experiences and moved before the speculators did.
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Source: European Economy No 64, Statistical Appendix and Bank of Greece, Economic Bulletin, various editions
Table 1: Unit root tests
Equation ∆yt  = ψ*yt-1+∑
=
p
i 1
ψ*i ∆t-1 +µ+γt+ut 1 ∆yt  = ψ*yt-1+ ∑
=
p
i 1
ψ*i ∆t-1 + µt+  ut 2
st ADF(0) = 0.114 ∆st ADF(2) = -2.644*
pt ADF(5) = - 0.334 ∆pt ADF(0) = -3.452*
p*t ADF(5) = -1.067 ∆p*t ADF(3)=-1.409
∆p*t + ADF(6) = -5.741**
Order of ADF lag structure in parenthesis; 1: Critical values are –3.46 at the5% level; -4.062 at the 1% level ;
2: Critical values are –1.94 at the 5% level; -2.589 at the 1% level; * rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level , **
rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level ; + ADF equation estimated including two dummy variables (see text) ;
The lag order of the ADF equations was selected to ensure that ut  presents no autocorrelation
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Table 2: Determination of VAR specification
PANEL A: DETERMINATION OF VAR ORDER
VAR estimated: zt = A1 zt-1 + …+ Ak zt-k  +Ψ Dt
z′= [constant  st  pt  p*t  ] , D′t = [D1 t   D2t  D3t ]
k=5 k= 4 k=3 k=2 k=1
Information selection criteria
Schwarz -29.187 -29.378 -29.657 -30.022 -29.617
Hannan-Quinn -30.125 -30.168 -30.299 -30.516 -29.962
Akaike -31.012 -30.758 -31.591 -31.509 -30.658
System mispecification tests
Vector AR autocorrelation 0.7352 1.063 1.205 1.228 2.8848**
Vector Normality χ 2 23.899** 27.466** 26.685** 24.307** 18.982**
Vector χ2 heteroscedasticity 0.8337 0.88255 0.8824 1.0374 1.8423**
PANEL B: DETERMINATION OF SYSTEM SPECIFICATION
VAR estimated: zt = A1 zt-1 + A2 zt-2  +Ψ Dt
z′= [ constant  st  pt  p*t  ] , D′t = [D1 t   D2t  D3t   D1983-1  D1998-1 D1980-2 D1985-3 D1985-4]
Individual equations  mispecification tests      System mispecification tests
St: AR autocorrelation – F-test 0.5926       Vector AR autocorrelation 1.1235
Pt: AR autocorrelation – F-test 2.1384       Vector Normality χ2 7.9276
P*t: AR autocorrelation – F-test 1.2678       Vector χ2 heteroscedasticity 0.8338
St: Normality χ2 1.3697       Vector χi*χj heteeroscedasticity 0.6364
Pt: Normality χ2 4.9501
P*t: Normality χ2 1.2196
St: ARCH F-test 0.7955
Pt: ARCH F-test 1.5646
P*t: ARCH F-test 0.4460
St: χ2 heteroscedasticity 1.0465
Pt: χ2 heteroscedasticity 1.0882
P*t: χ2 heteroscedasticity 1.2321
St: χiχj auteroscedasticity 0.7455
Pt: χiχj auteroscedasticity 0.5839
P*t: χiχj auteroscedasticity 1.0224
*   Rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level , ** Rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level
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Table 3: Cointegration analysis
PANEL A: DETERMINATION OF COINTEGRATION RANK
H0 H1 λmax  statistic 95% CV λrrace statistic 95% CV
r = 0 r = 1 70.02** 22.0 81.51** 34.9
r ≤ 1 r = 2 10.38 15.7 11.49 20.0
r ≤ 2 r = 3 1.11 9.2 1.11 9.2
Standardized beta′ eigenvectors
st Pt p*t constant
1.0000 -1.3090 2.7509 -5.0008
-0.9469 1.0000 -1.9275 3.9060
-0.1765 -0.0031 1.0000 -1.6151
Standardized alpha coefficients
St 0.093713 0.015330 0.042556
Pt 0.096472 0.0010448 -0.011680
P*t 0.0065151 0.013266 -0.0047130
PANEL B
(a) Testing cointegration restrictions in beta′ vector β0 st  + β1 pt  + β2 p*t  + constant   (cointegrating rank =1)
Restriction LR-test χ2 (1)
11.62**
15.551**
19.394**
H0 : β0 = 0 (st  does not enter the cointegration space)
H0 : β1 = 0 (pt  does not enter the cointegration space)
H0 : β2 = 0 (p*t  does not enter the cointegration space)
H0 : constant = 0  ( constant does not enter the cointegration space) 17.755**
(b) Testing cointegration restrictions in alpha matrix  (cointegrating rank =1)
LR-test χ2 (1)
19.745**
58.588**
H0 : αs = 0 (st weakly exogenous to the system)
H0 : αp = 0 (pt weakly exogenous to the system)
H0 : αp∗ = 0 (p*t weakly exogenous to the system) 2.761
PANEL C: RESTRICTED COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS (cointegrating rank =1 and αp∗ = 0)
Beta′  matrix st pt p*t constant
0.15332 -0.19896 0.41925 -0.76566
Standardized beta′ eigenvectors
st =  4.9937 + 1.2976 pt -2.7344 p*t
pt =- 3.843 + 0.7706 pt  + 2.1072 p*t
Alpha matrix
st
(std. errors in parenthesis) pt
p*t
0.68893 (0.14409)
0.61819 (0.07153)
0.0000 (0.0000)
*   Rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level, ** Rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level
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